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Abstract
This paper investigates the extent to which taxes, free cash flows and the
level of debt were likely to have influenced MLP formations. We limit the analysis
to two types of MLP formation: (1 ) complete or partial liquidation of corporate assets
(conversions), and (2) retention of the corporate form as general partner with
assets and liabilities allocated to the MLP (roll-outs). In addition to the analysis of
MLP formations, we investigate the extent to which the taxes, free cash flows and
debt levels are more closely associated with either of these types of MLP formation.
The results suggest that prior to 1 986 MLP formations were likely to be associated
with the tax burden and the level of free cash flows prior to MLP formation. During
1986 it appears that only the tax benefits were influencing the formation of MLPs.
In 1987, when Congress established corporate taxation for MLPs, the results are
inconclusive and suggest that the model is misspecified with regard to incentives
operating behind 1987 MLP formations. In addition, we find that MLP roll-outs are
more closely associated with the firm's free cash flows. We also find that MLP
conversions appear to be associated with the level of debt and tax burden prior to
MLP formation. In both sets of analyses we find that the model is not a good
predictor of MLP formation nor MLP type.

Incentives Behind Corporate
Formations of Master Limited Partnerships
Introduction
In 1981, the Master Limited Partnership (MLP) organizational form emerged
as an alternative to the regular HC" corporation. Even though MLPs possessed
attributes of their corporate counterparts, such as limited legal liability, free
transferability of partnership units and unlimited life, they were considered
partnerships for income tax purposes. This allowed MLP earnings to avoid
corporate "double taxation" and led some supporters to claim that MLPs were
superior to corporations because of the potential for increased cash flows to
investors. 1
In 1 985, more than 30 MLPs were in existence, most in the oil and gas
industry. The number of MLPs increased substantially during 1986 and the first
half of 1987, and by 1988 more than 119 MLPs were operating in a variety of
industries [Stanger Register, 1988, pp. 103-104]. While some MLPs represented
new business concerns, many were formed when existing corporations converted
to MLP status by transferring some or substantially all of their operating assets to
the MLP.
During this time, tax savings was suggested as the primary motivation for
MLP formation (the tax motive ). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) contributed
to the increase in MLPs by decreasing the attractiveness of doing business as a
corporation relative to doing business as a flow-through entity, such as an S-
corporation or partnership. 2 Scholes and Wolfson [1990, p. 154] stated that "the
corporate form of organization has become significantly less attractive from a tax
standpoint relative to partnerships than it was under prior law." ServiceMaster Inc.
provided the following rationale for conversion to MLP status:
"The primary purpose of the proposed reorganization is to enable
ServiceMaster to operate after 1986 without the imposition of a
corporate income tax and thereby, among other things, increase
the amount of cash available for distribution or reinvestment to
those who invest in ServiceMaster or for use in developing the
ServiceMaster business."
Although it is likely that tax incentives played a role, it is not clear they were
always the dominant reason firms decided to establish or convert to an MLP, Two
important non-tax motives exist that would also encourage expansion of MLPs
during the 1980's: (1) Owners may have wanted to limit management discretion
over the reinvestment of internally generated cash flow (the control motive) and/or
(2) they may have wanted to replace debt with equity financing (the financing
motive).
This study investigates the extent to which the tax, control, and financing
motives were likely to have influenced MLP formations. The analysis was limited to
two types of MLP formation: (1) Conversions-complete or partial liquidation of
corporate assets, and (2) Roll-outs-retention of the corporate form as general
partner with assets and liabilities allocated to the MLP. In addition the study
investigates the extent to which one of these three motives is more closely
associated than the others with either type of MLP formation.
The data suggest that, prior to 1 986, firms with substantial cash flows and
high tax burdens were more likely to form an MLP than firms with limited cash
flows. In contrast , during 1 986 MLP formations were associated with firms that had
high tax burdens. The pre-1986 results are particularly important from a tax policy
perspective because of Congress' reaction to the apparent tax advantage
associated with MLPs. Congress cited the potential "disincorporation of America"
as likely if MLPs were allowed to dominate the corporate form of doing business for
tax purposes.3
In an effort to preserve the corporate tax base and avoid future
administrative complexities associated with these large pass-through entities,
Congress imposed corporate tax treatment for most publicly traded partnerships,
for taxable years beginning after 1987. This ended the tax advantage associated
with MLP formation. Because at least one non-tax motive appears to be important
before 1986, changes in tax policy that remove perceived tax advantages should
not penalize those MLPs that exist due to non-tax motives. Congress should
consider carefully the cost of reducing the distinction between corporations and
MLPs in determining future tax policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section one provides a
review of MLPs and a summary of previous research. Section two reviews tax and
non-tax motives for establishing MLPs. Section three describes the methodology
used, sample selection, and tests of hypotheses. Section four discusses the results
on the association between the three motives and MLP formation and the
additional analysis concerning the type of MLP formation chosen. Section five
provides a summary and conclusion.
Master Limited Partnerships
MLP Formation
The first MLP was started by Apache Corporation in 1981
.
4 By 1988 more
than 119 MLPs were operating in oil and gas, real estate, agriculture, timber
management, equipment leasing, cable television systems, hotel/motels, sports
franchises and other activities. 5 The four basic methods for creating MLPs are
briefly summarized as follows [Willis et. al., 1989, p.35-3]:
Conversions: MLPs can be created by a corporate contribution
of all, or substantially all, of its assets to the MLP in exchange
for most of the MLP interests followed by a complete liquidation
of the corporation and distribution of the partnership interests to
the shareholders.
Roll-outs: MLPs can be created by another entity, usually a
corporation, that transfers some of its assets to the partnership
in exchange for the general and some or all of the limited
partnership units. The corporation may distribute these units to
its shareholders as a dividend or sell the units as part of a
secondary offering. In addition, the MLP may sell additional
units to the public at the time of the roll-out in a primary offering.
MLPs can also be created through taxable transactions. The
MLP first completes a public offering of its partnership units.
The cash received from the offering is then used to purchase
the business segment of the corporation. This results in a
taxable transaction with the MLP recording its new assets (and
related liabilities, if any) at the cost of purchase.
Roll-ups: MLPs can be created by combining a number of
existing partnerships into a single MLP. The tax results of the
roll-up are basically the same as those in the formation of any
other limited partnership.
Contributions: MLPs can be created from scratch by the
sponsor creating the partnership. The partnership sells the
units on the open market for cash and then uses the proceeds
to purchase operating assets.
Of the 119 MLPs in existence in 1988, 26% were created by conversions,
23% by roll-outs, 21% by roll-ups and 30% by contributions (see footnote 5). Only
the MLPs created by conversions, roll-outs, and roll-ups have publicly available
data concerning the entity prior to its MLP existence. Of these firms, only those
MLPs formed by conversion or roll-out switched all or part of their business
operations from the corporate to the partnership organizational form. Because we
are concerned with changes from the corporate to MLP form the study is limited to
examining the factors that are likely to have influenced the firm's decision to form
an MLP through conversion or roll-out.
MLP Taxation
Like other limited partnerships, MLPs are subject to the Subchapter
K rules under of the Internal Revenue Code. The major characteristics that
distinguish MLPs from other limited partnerships are: (1) MLP partnership
interests are registered with the SEC, (2) MLPs are generally larger in size,
and (3) MLP limited partners can purchase and sell units in an established
market.
Prior to 1987, MLPs had two of the six characteristics that force corporate tax
treatment of an entity. 6 However, because Congress became concerned about the
number of firms seeking MLP status, it amended Section 7704 of the Revenue Act
of 1987, which required that certain publicly held partnerships be treated as
corporations for tax purposes. It also established a single conclusive test of -public
trading- as the factor that determines corporate treatment. Consequently, because
of public trading, MLPs were generally subject to corporate tax treatment. An
exception allowed MLPs, in existence as of December 17, 1987, to be taxed as
partnerships until : (1) December 17, 1997 or, (2) a significant new line of business
was added to the MLP, whichever was earlier [Willis et. al., 1989, p. 35-3].
MLP's-Prior Research
Moore, Christiansen and Roefeldt [1988] investigated the effects of
MLP formation on the share price of parent corporations for the period 1982
to 1 987. They hypothesized a positive share price reaction for the two-day
period on and before the announcement of MLP formation. A positive
reaction could be attributed to: 1) the favorable tax status of MLPs, 2) the
potential for additional cash flows to investors, and 3) dividend signalling
effects because the level of cash disbursements to equity holders typically
change when corporate assets are switched into MLP assets.7
Moore et al.[1988, p.108] also hypothesized that the positive price reaction
associated with the "good news" of the MLP formation would offset any negative
price reactions associated with MLP "bad news " Bad news might include the
additional administrative costs, financing of the MLP, and conflicts of interest
between the general and limited partners. Their results suggest that.on average,
firms shifting assets to an MLP experienced significant, positive price reactions of
as much as seven percent around the MLP announcement dates. Because
positive price reactions could be attributed to any of three "good news" arguments
(1) tax advantage, (2) additional cash flow and (3) information signalling, it was not
possible to discern which "good news" item caused the favorable reaction.
Collins and Bey's [1986] analysis examined whether MLPs were likely to be
a wide spread form of doing business or were applicable only to the energy
industry were they currently occurred in the greatest numbers. The study
compared the financial advantages and disadvantages of the two entities as well
as the legal, regulatory and economic developments which were likely to have
motivated the formation of MLPs. Collins and Bey [1986, p. 6] note:
".
. . the MLPs seems to possess the other important corporate
advantages: limited liability, transferable ownership, and
unlimited life;
. . .the MLP offers significant reductions in effective tax rates
The MLP requires more detailed record-keeping and reduces
the owner's control over management in matters not addressed
by the partnership agreement."
A model presented to explain the MLP decision [Collins and Bey 1986, p 7]
predicted that when corporate tax rates are higher than personal rates, MLP unit
holders receive greater after-tax cash flows than their common shareholder
counterparts. On the other hand, when corporate tax rates are lower than personal
rates, the MLP unit holder is likely to receive smaller cash flows than common
shareholders. Overall, the model indicates that MLPs are preferred by firms with
high corporate tax rates and low reinvestment rates (i.e., firms likely to have
substantial cash flows) [Collins and Bey, 1 986, p.7]). 8
Shevlin [1987] investigated a decision similar to the MLP formation decision
by examining the use of limited partnerships (LPs) to fund research and
development (R&D) ventures rather than funding these ventures through internally
generated cash flows. Shevlin cited tax considerations, off-balance sheet
financing, and risk sharing between the R&D firm and other parties as factors
favoring the use of limited partnerships. Costs that would discourage using LPs
included the transaction costs of establishing the LPs and costs associated with
disclosing competitive firm secrets.
Shevlin's results generally supported the tax hypothesis but were sensitive
to the method used to measure the corporate marginal tax rate [Shevlin, 1987, p.
506]. The results for the off-balance sheet financing motive were mixed, but
suggested that financing could be an incentive for using LPs.
Testable Hypotheses
In this section we discuss the statistical hypotheses used in this study to
distinguish among the tax, control, and financing motives for forming MLPs.
The Tax Hypothesis
There are two primary reasons why taxes might influence corporate
conversions to MLPs [Davis, 1988, p. 53-54]. First, because of the conduit
principle, partnership earnings are not subject to "double taxation" as are corporate
earnings. Consequently, firms that have a long history of high dividend payout
rates may be better off as an MLP because, after conversion, they may have
greater after-tax cash flows available for distribution. Second, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 further increased the attractiveness of the MLP through changes designed to
shift the tax burden from the individual to the corporate sector [Givoly and Hahn,
1989, p. 51]. The primary factor was the reduction in the marginal tax rates for
individual investors below corporate marginal rates. Scholes and Wolfson [1991,
p. 4-11] state: "[W]ith the 1986 Tax Act, the partnership tax rate not only fell below
the corporate tax rate, but in addition shareholders faced a further tax on dividends
and capital gains. As a result of the 1986 Tax Act, partnerships became superior to
corporations as a way to minimize taxes."
In addition, other provisions of TRA 86 reduced the desirability of the
corporate entity, including the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine that limited
capital gains available to corporate shareholders, and the new corporate
alternative minimum tax that potentially raised tax rates for many medium and small
corporations. The evidence provided in the studies discussed above suggests that
prior to 1986 tax motives were associated with the absence of double taxation for
MLPs and that the tax motive increased substantially after 1986. This suggests the
following hypothesis:
Tax Hypothesis: Corporations that form MLPs have higher tax rates than
corporations that do not form MLPs.
Tax rate (TAX) is measured by the firm's current federal and state tax
provision divided by net income before taxes and extraordinary items (also referred
to as the firm's effective tax rate (ETR)).
The Control Hypothesis
Jensen [1 986, p. 323] suggests that managers may have an incentive to
allow the firm to grow beyond its optimal size because their power increases as the
amount of resources under their control increases. In addition, Mann and
Sicherman [1991, p.215] state that ". . . managers have incentives to expand firm
size (whether or not the expansion increases shareholder wealth) since executive
compensation and promotion are positively related to firm size." Managers of firms
with limited investment opportunities are likely to find themselves pressured by
investors to pay dividends rather than invest the firm's cash flow in low return or
negative net present value projects. 9
Because a firm's cash flows are the property of it's investors, re-investment
decisions should be guided by investor interests rather than by management's
preferences [Kensinger, 1986, p. 73]. When management and owner interests are
8
not aligned, managers are likely to invest in low return projects rather than return
free cash flows to investors (who may have opportunities to invest in higher return
projects). Jensen [1986, p. 323] suggests that in this situation owners must
determine "how to motivate managers to distribute the cash rather than investing it
at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies." He uses
the term "control hypothesis" to label prediction that restructuring will be used to
return free cash flows to equity holders via leveraged buy-outs [1986, p. 324].
Kensinger [1986, p. 73] also argues that reorganizing the firm using a non-
corporate form, such as an MLP, is consistent with the control hypothesis and "may
serve as a means of accomplishing the task of putting the investors back in the
drivers seat, while still providing them with the corporate advantage of limited
liability." Kensinger [1986, p. 79] uses the phrase "Unfirming the firm" to describe
"the phenomenon of returning resources to the control of the marketplace." 10
Currently, managers are not only expected to run existing operations effectively,
but also to take primary responsibility for deciding how to reinvest the firm's cash
flows. When a corporation becomes a managing partner in an MLP, its
management is charged with the efficient operation of existing enterprises, but may
be cut out of the reinvestment decision because the partnership agreements
usually spell out how partnership profits will be shared and may provide explicit
contractual terms for the disposition of free cash flows generated from operations. 11
Thus, the limited partners enjoy the advantage of corporate limited liability, but
relinquish much less power to managers than do corporate shareholders. In
addition, they may be the direct recipients of the free cash flows from operations
and thus able to choose whether they wish to provide funding for the development
of new projects or invest in other, higher return projects. This suggests that
corporations with substantial free cash flows and limited investment possibilities
will be restructured by investors, so investors can retain more control over these
funds. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Control Hypothesis: Corporations that form MLPs have higher levels of free
cash flows than corporations that do not form MLPs
Free cash flows (FREE) is measured two ways ; the first implements Rao's
(1991) definition of total cash flows as net income before extraordinary items plus
the change in working capital (less cash and short-term investments) plus current
year deferred taxes plus current year depreciation and amortization; the second is
total free cash flows minus dividends. Dividends are defined as dividends
declared and paid during the year. We use both measures because neither
measure is a perfect proxy for free cash flows. These measures will tend to
overstate the amount of free cash flows available to the firm. However, the
overstatement should affect both MLP and non-MLP firms equally.
The Financing Hypothesis
Scholes and Wolfson [1991
,
p. 15-20] suggest that aspects of the 1986
Tax Act made the corporate organizational form less desirable than various non-
corporate organizational forms. Firms that wanted to distribute some or all of their
earnings to shareholders were motivated to distribute funds using methods other
than paying dividends. For example, debt financing is preferred because
debtholders pay tax only once on the interest payment and the corporation takes a
deduction for the payment, reducing its own taxable income.
In contrast, Lee [1988, p.1 18] notes that limited partnership equity may serve
as an alternative financing arrangement for corporations with high debt levels. He
states that [1988, p. 1 18], "... limited partners' equity traditionally served as an
alternative to conventional debt financing with resultant lower PTP [Publicly Traded
Partnerships] debt-equity ratios and higher rates of PTP distributions
10
(corresponding to debt amortization in conventional large C corporations) than
those of large C corporations." This suggests that MLPs are one means of
converting from debt to equity financing so that cash distributions will go to the
equity holders of the firm as distributions rather than to outside bondholders as
interest. As a result, corporations with high debt levels may convert to MLPs to
replace debt with equity financing and pay out larger distributions to shareholders.
This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:
Financing Hypothesis: Corporations that form MLPs have higher
debt/equity ratios than corporations that do not form MLPs
Our debt measure (DEBT) is long term debt due within one year plus long
term debt plus notes payable. Equity is measured by DEBT plus stockholders
equity.
Disincentives for MLP formations.
Three hypotheses have been introduced to explain the creation of MLPs in
the 1 980s. However, there are factors associated with converting to and/or
creating an MLP that could reduce the number of firms using this restructuring
approach. This section discusses two sets of these factors.
First, the administrative costs of organizing and operating an MLP can be
substantial, and could conceivably offset any gains resulting from reorganization.
Examples are: a) the corporate and individual taxes payable on gains arising from
a conversion, especially after the repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine,
[Davis,1986, p.55], b) the costs of establishing the partnership including
organizational and syndication costs (e.g., attorneys, underwriters, and
accountants, fees), and c) the costs of administering the MLP, including the
detailed tax records that must be kept by the firm for each limited partner.
11
Second the potential exists for conflicts of interest between general and
limited partners. Conflicts are also likely to exist between lines of business when
the corporation continues to exist as it does in the roll-out. Moore et. al. [1989, p.
116] state that: "the potential conflict is severe when the parent continues in the
same line of business as the rolled out MLP or has subsidiaries in that line of
business." On the other hand, these line of business conflicts may be reduced to
the extent that MLP interest holders retain interests in the corporate general
partner.
Methodology
Sample Selection and Data
The initial listing of 1 19 MLP's was obtained from the October 1988 issue of
the Stanger Register (see footnote 5). From this group, firms meeting the following
criteria were included in the sample:
1. The MLP was created through conversion or roll-out,
2. For conversions, there must be at least two years of financial
statement data for the corporate entity prior to its conversion
date,
3. For roll-outs, there must be at least two years of pre-roll-out
financial statement data relating to the corporate assets
transferred to the MLP, and
4. Complete data for the independent variables must be
available for all firms meeting criteria 1-3.
The first filter reduced the initial sample of 1 19 firms to 56 firms that were
formed either through the roll-out or conversion method. Of these 56 firms, four
were deleted from the sample because available data indicated they were "not
going concerns", S-Corporations,or they were utilities prior to MLP formation. This
left 30 MLP conversions and 22 MLP roll-outs eligible for inclusion in the sample.
Filters 2 and 3 removed an additional thirteen firms leaving 39 firms of which 27
12
were conversions and twelve roll-outs. One additional treatment firm was removed
because the estimated FREE variable was 20 standard deviations from the mean.
The firm was treated as an outlier for the treatment group and the results presented
do not include the firm. 12 The final sample included 38 treatment firms (26
conversions and 12 roll-out). Table 1 summarizes the selection of treatment firms.
Table 2 shows the MLP formation year for both roll-outs and conversions. Note that
26 of the 38 MLPs were formed after 1985 and 9 of the 38 are in the oil and gas
industry. Five of the nine were formed by roll-outs; and the remainder were
conversions. Appendix A is a detailed list of all of the sample firms included in the
study.
The data utilized for this study were obtained from the Form 10-K or security
offering document of the MLP at the time it initially went public or the Form 10-K of
the corporation prior to the year of its conversion to a MLP. 13 The financial
information for the period prior to the conversion or roll-out is used to determine an
association between the three hypotheses and MLP formation. 14 .
Control Group
The following methodology was employed to select control firms. First, the
two-digit SIC codes of the MLPs listed in Appendix A were obtained. This listing
was then sorted by MLP formation year. Then, control firms which had the same
two-digit SIC codes as the MLPs in each formation year were selected from
COMPUSTAT. Finally, only those firms that had total assets between the
minimum/maximum total assets for the MLP treatment firms in each formation year
were included in each years' control group15
These procedures resulted in 289 matching firms, of which 55 are
associated with the pre-1986 MLP firms and 234 with the 1986 and 1987 MLP
firms. The pre-1986 treatment firms are combined into one group due to the small
number of pre-1986 MLPs. The 1986 and 1987 control firms are the same and
13
none of the control firms formed MLPs during the period 1981 to 1987. Descriptive
statistics for treatment and control firms for each of the test periods are presented in
Table 3. For each group (period), the mean, standard deviation, and
minimum/maximum amounts are shown for DEBT, TAX, and FREE.
Controlling for Size
Scholes and Wolfson (1990) suggest that small closely held corporations
are likely to form MLPs. This suggests that control firms should be matched on size
to control for the possibility that size of the firm will confound the hypotheses tests.
However, initial attempts to match on size within plus or minus 10% (then 20% of
net sales or total assets did not provide matching firms for the smaller treatment
firms. As a result, control firms were accepted if total assets were between the
minimum and maximum total assets for the treatment group. Table 3 provides
summary statistics for the size distributions of the treatment and control firms.
Because the control group tends to be biased toward the larger firms, we tested for
size differences between the treatment and control firms to determine whether a
control variable for size should be included in the analysis. The tests indicate that
for the pre-1986 treatment and control groups, average total assets for the
treatment firms were significantly larger (p=.0498). For the 1986 groups, average
total assets for the control group are significantly larger than the treatment group
(p=.0861). Finally, for the 1987 groups, the average total assets are not
significantly different. On the other hand, the 1987 treatment firms have a higher
total assets variance than the control firms.
The data in Table 3 also indicate that, total assets for the three treatment firm
groups vary substantially over the three tests periods. For example, average total
assets for the pre-1986 treatment group is substantially larger than the 1986 or
1987 treatment group average. This difference is primarily attributable to the fact
that the pre-1986 treatment sample includes Sun Energy Partners ($5.6 billion in
14
total assets) and Mesa Limited Partnership ($3.95 billion in total assets). If these
firms are excluded from the sample, mean total assets for the pre-1986 MLP group
would decrease to $389 million. However, this is still 64.8% larger than average
total assets for the pre-1 986 control firms and 267.40% larger than the average
total assets for 1987 MLP firms.
In addition, average total assets for the 1986 MLP firms, is smaller in relation
to other MLP groups as well as its own 1986 control group. Thirteen of the
nineteen 1986 treatment firms have total assets of $132 million or less in the year
prior to their MLP formation, with The Marina L.P. and Universal Medical Buildings
L.P. having $3,096 million and $3,936 million in total assets, respectively. This is
consistent with Scholes and Wolfson's argument that smaller firms were likely to
form MLPs.
Based on the discussion above we will include a control for size when we
test for the combined effect of TAX, DEBT, and FREE on the decision to form an
MLP.
Potential Sampling Problems
Zmijewski (1984, p. 77) suggests that model parameter estimates may be
biased because of two potential problems that occur when treatment and control
firm frequencies are not consistent with population frequencies. The first problem
occurs when the researcher observes the dependent variable (in this case MLP
formation) and selects a sample based on that knowledge. This procedure tends to
favor selecting treatment firms in excess of their frequency in the population.
Zmijewski suggests that this problem can be reduced by selecting treatment and
control firms in frequencies representative of population frequencies. In light of this
suggestion data for substantially more control firms than treatment firms were
collected to reduce the effect of this problem. The second problem involves
estimating a model using firms whose data were only complete for all periods. In
15
the financial distress literature this bias occurs because failed firms with partial
information but with the highest probability of failure have a lower probability of
being included in the sample. Thus, the population probabilities of treatment firm
occurrence is understated. The treatment sample of conversion and roll-out MLPs
was selected from a larger set of firms 13 of which were excluded because of
insufficient data. The extent to which this bias may have affected the results has
not been determined. Although, Zmijewski shows the biases exist in financial
distress samples, apparently they were not serious enough to change inferences.
Thus, the sample frequencies in this study may not substantially affect inferences
about MLP formations.
Analysis
Two levels of analysis were conducted in this study. The first is an attempt to
determine whether MLP formation is associated with the tax, control or financing
hypotheses during the three test periods. We selected the three test periods
because they represent a natural transition in the tax hypothesis. Prior to 1986 tax
incentives for forming MLPs were likely to be associated with removing the double
taxation of corporate distributions. During 1986 the Tax Reform Act was passed
and corporations became aware of the additional benefits associated with changes
in marginal rates and additional disadvantages with the corporate form of doing
business. Finally, 1987 represents the period in which all new MLPs (formed after
December 17, 1987) would be treated as corporations for tax purposes and
existing MLPs were notified of corporate taxation at the earlier of, December 17,
1997, or when new lines of business were added. Thus each period represents a
change in tax policy that was likely to differentially influence the choice of
organizational form.
The second level of analysis is an attempt to determine if the hypotheses
apply more to one of the two types of MLP formation. Each level of analysis
16
involves both univariate and multivariate tests. The multivariate tests use probit
model estimates and test for the combined effect of these three motives on MLP
formation.
The Model
Dietrich [1984] suggests two rationales for estimating a model: (1) testing the
association between factors and an event of interest (e.g., MLP formation) and (2)
developing a model to predict an event of interest (MLP formation). This study
represents an initial attempt to detect an association between the tax, control, and
financing motives and MLP formation. Consequently, although we present the
percentage of correct predictions for the probit model, the main concern is with
model coefficient estimates and their significance. Prediction of MLP formation for
future research.
Probit models have been shown to be appropriate in cases where the
dependent variable is dichotomous and qualitative in nature [Aldrich and Nelson,
1984, p. 48]. The specific form of the probit model is as follows:
MLPj = Brji + BiTAXj + B2FREEj + B3DEBTJ+ e.
Where:
MLPj = 1 if firm i converted to MLP, and otherwise.
TAXj = firm i's effective tax rate.
FREEj = the total cash flows of the firm i
DEBTj total debt / (stockholders equity plus total debt) for
firm i.
ei = the residual.
The hypotheses suggest that the sign of the estimated coefficients for
this model should all be positive. In addition to the problems regarding the
frequencies of treatment and control firms, these variables are likely to be
correlated. Therefore tests for multicollinearity problems were conducted on
the matrix of independent variables. The tests suggest there are no
17
degrading effects from multicollinearity for the analyses of pre-1986, 1986,
1987, or between conversion and roll-out MLP model estimates.
Results
Univariate Tests
Univariate analyses are used to determine whether the means presented in
Table 3 are significantly different for treatment and control firms during the three
test periods. A Mann-Whitney test is used because it does not require that the
sample populations be normally distributed. The tests for DEBT, TAX and FREE
are one-tailed because the hypotheses predict these variables to be larger for
treatment firms.
For three treatment firms, the registration statement or prospectus did not
provide adequate information to estimate the TAX variable. In these cases, the
parent corporation's ETR was used. In addition, the ETR of firms with a tax benefit
and net loss before taxes and extraordinary items, was set to zero because the
positive ETR was uninterpretable. Firms with a positive state and federal tax
provision, but a net loss before taxes and extraordinary items, were coded as a
"one" to represent 1 00% taxation. This treatment is consistent with Omer, Molloy
and Ziebart, [1991
, p. 63]. In addition, the registration statements for two firms did
not include any tax information for either the entity or its parent in the year prior to
its MLP formation. In these cases, the ETR was estimated using the applicable tax
rates in place in the year prior to the MLP formation.
Table 4 presents the results of the univariate tests. Before 1 986, the mean
differences between treatment and control firms on TAX, and FREE are significant
and in the predicted direction at p- 0.0359, and 0.0032 respectively. For DEBT
the mean difference is not significant for pre-1986 MLP formations. This suggests
that the firm's cash flows and tax burden influenced MLP formation before 1986.
On the other hand, only TAX is significant and in the predicted direction for the
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mean difference between 1986 treatment and control groups (p=0.0032). This
suggests that only the firm's tax burden influenced MLP formation. Finally there are
no significant differences for TAX, FREE, and DEBT between the 1987 treatment
and control groups.
In summary, these results support the control and tax motives as factors that
were likely to have influenced MLP formations prior to 1986. The results also
support the tax motives for 1986 MLP formations; however, no support is found for
the tax, control, and financing motives for 1987 MLP formations.
Probit Results
Probit analysis allows us to determine which (if any) of these inter-related
factors dominated the MLP decision. Table 5, Panel A, presents results for the pre-
1986 test period. The chi-square for the model is 18.6847, and is significant at the
.01 level; the regression has an overall r-square of 0.4152. The estimated
coefficients for FREE and TAX are positive and significant (p<.02). The coefficient
for SIZE is significant and positive, which is consistent with the univariate results
noted earlier indicating significant differences in total assets between treatment
and control firms. Table 5, Panel B, provides the model estimate for the 1986 test
period. The r-square is 0.1933 and the chi-square is 17.41 19, which is significant
at p=01. The estimated coefficients for TAX and DEBT are positive and significant
at p<.01 and p<.05 respectively. The results of the probit analysis on the MLPs
formed in 1987 are presented in Table 5, Panel C. The model is not significant and
consistent with the univariate results indicates no difference between treatment and
control firms for 1987 MLP.
Overall, the results suggest that the control and tax hypotheses are
associated with MLP formation prior to 1986. During 1986 only the tax hypothesis
is associated with MLP formations. For 1987 we find no support for the hypotheses
regarding MLP formation. The absence of univariate and multivariate results in
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1987 suggests that the model is misspecified regarding the incentives that
influenced MLP formation during 1987. This is the year Congress decided that
ultimately all MLPs would be taxed as corporations. Consequently, future analyses
could focus on correctly specifying a model of the incentives for forming MLPs in
1987 and on increasing the model's ability to predict MLP conversions in 1986 and
prior years. The next section is a preliminary step toward improving our
understanding of the incentives behind MLP formation.
Analysis of MLP Firms-Roll-outs vs. Conversions
The purpose of this section is to determine which form of MLP formation
(conversion or roll-out) is more closely associated with the three hypotheses tested
in the previous section. Descriptive statistics for the conversion and roll-out MLPs
are presented in Table 6. Results of tests for mean differences in SIZE, TAX,
FREE, and DEBT are presented in Table 7. These results suggest that firms
forming MLPs through conversions were significantly larger and had smaller cash
flows.
Table 8 presents the model estimated on the sample of treatment firms. The
dependent variable, MLP, is now conversion and roll-out firms with conversions
coded as "1" and roll-out firms coded as "0". The model chi-square is 10.4176,
significant at p<.05, and has an r-square of 0.3364. The estimated coefficient for
FREE is negative and significant at p<.01. The coefficients for DEBT and TAX
are positive but not significant
.
This suggests that smaller firms with greater cash flows chose the roll-out
method of forming an MLP over the conversion method. It also suggests that the
results of the previous analyses might be different if the model is estimated on MLP
roll-outs and conversions separately. Control firms for this additional analysis were
obtained using the maximum and minimum total assets for roll-out and conversion
firms and the total number of control firms was reduced from the previous control
20
sample. The procedure resulted in 57 control firms for the MLP roll-out sample and
219 firms for the MLP conversion sample. Because of the limited sample size for
roll-out and conversion firms, the analysis was conducted by combining all three
tests periods into one covering 1981-1987.
Univariate tests
Univariate results for roll-out and conversion MLPs versus their respective
control group are presented in Table 9. The mean difference between roll-out firms
and their control group for FREE is significant at p=.013 and the mean difference
on DEBT is significant at p=.0214. It appears that, based on the univariate results
MLP roll-out firms have more cash flows and less debt than their control group. For
the conversion MLPs versus their control group only the mean difference for TAX is
significant at p<.01 . These results suggest that MLP roll-outs are more closely
associated with the amount of cash flows in the firm. This is consistent with
arguments in the control hypothesis in which the corporation is likely to be the
general partner with limited partners determining distribution and investment of
cash flows. On the other hand, conversions appear to be associated with the tax
benefits of MLP status, thus allowing the firm to escape corporate tax treatment and
generate greater after-tax cash flows for distributional.
Multivariate tests
The univariate results suggest that there are distinct differences in the
incentives behind the type of MLP formation. The probit model is used again to
determine what the combined effect of these motives is on formation type.
Table 10 presents the results of the probit regression on MLP roll-outs. The
model is significant (p< .01) with a chi-square of 18.6695 and an r-square of
0.3967. The coefficient for FREE is positive and significant (p<.02). The coefficient
for TAX is positive but not significant and the coefficient for DEBT is negative and
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not significant. These results support the notion that the amount of cash flows
dominates the decision to form an MLP through the roll-out method.
The results of the probit regression on MLP conversions are presented in
Table 11. The model chi-square is 15.9465 and is significant at the p<,01 ; the r-
square is 0.12816. The coefficients for DEBT and TAX are positive and significant
at p< .01 . This suggests that firms with high tax burdens and debt ratios use the
conversion method to form an MLP. The coefficient for FREE is not significant in
this model, but has the predicted sign. These results are slightly different than the
univariate results which suggest that only the tax benefits associated with
conversion are important. However, one might also conclude that the tax and
financing motives are not mutually exclusive because both may be important in the
decision to convert to MLP status.
Summary and Conclusion
As a result of Congressional actions, future MLPs will be taxed as
corporations. The underlying assumption by Congress appears to be that tax
savings were the primary motive for MLP formation. This study investigated two
research questions concerning the motives behind MLP formation. The first, asked
whether the tax, control, or financing motives might not all be associated with the
formation of MLPs. The results suggest that, prior to 1 986 MLP formations were
likely to be associated with tax benefits and improved control over cash flows.
During 1986 it appears that only the tax benefits were influenced the MLP
formation. This is consistent with arguments that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would
make the corporate form less desirable relative to a flow through entity. For 1 987,
the year in which Congress established corporate taxation for MLPs, the results are
inconclusive and suggest that the model does not fully capture the motives behind
1 987 MLP formations.
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The second question addressed is whether the type of change selected
(conversion or roll-out) might not reflect the particular motive driving the MLP
formation. The results suggest MLP roll-outs are associated with a firm's cash
flows, which is consistent with arguments that controlling cash flows can be
accomplished through a non-corporate form. We also find that MLP conversions
are associated with both the firm's tax burden and level of debt prior to MLP
formation, which is consistent with both the tax and financing motives. The model
is not a good predictor of MLP formation, nor of the type of change in either set of
analyses.
Although the evidence presented is preliminary, we suggest that tax policy
efforts to mitigate tax advantages associated with MLP formation impose costs on
MLPs that exist for reasons other than tax savings. The costs imposed on MLPs
that currently exist and the economic consequences of restricting future MLP
formations should be an integral part of the analyses of policy changes designed to
remove tax advantages. The cost of reducing the distinction between corporations
and MLPs should be considered carefully by Congressional leaders when they
deliberate future tax policies that affect the organization of business enterprise.
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FOOTNOTES
1 • It was also posited that the increased cash flows available for distribution to
partners would cause the market to revalue underperforming assets included in the
MLP and reduce the incentives for takeovers of the parent firm [Collins and Bey,
1986, p.5]. This line of reasoning is also echoed in Limberg [1986, p. 84] who
notes that: "A dropdown MLP is usually formed by a large (sponsor) company that
may be a potential takeover target or has domestic assets that the stock market has
discounted relative to their appraised value."
2. The TRA 86 reduced the top individual marginal income tax rate to six
percentage points below the top corporate marginal income tax rate-28% for
individuals and 34% for corporations. In contrast, under pre-TRA 86 law, the top
corporate marginal rate was four percentage points below the top individual
marginal rate-46% for corporations and 50% for individuals.
3. America Disincorporated, Forbes, June 16, 1986.
4. Apache Petroleum was the first MLP organized as a going concern. The first
MLP was created by Teeco Properties in October, 1978. The MLP was formed
pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation of Tishman Realty and Construction Co.
It's principal objective was to sell/dispose of the Tishman properties and distribute
the proceeds to the unit holders.
5. This information was obtained from two sources. The initial listing of MLPs was
obtained from the 1988 issue of the Stanger Register. The industry affiliation
information was obtained from the Annual Reports, Form 10-K's and/or initial
Security Offering Documents of each MLP.
6. The six characteristics are: associates, an objective to carry on a business for
profit, centralized management, continuity of life, free transferability of interests, and
limited liability for owners.
7. Moore et. ai. also hypothesize [p. 108] "[W]hen firms isolate subsets of assets,
positive valuation effects may result from reduction in informational asymmetry
between informed managers and uninformed investors regarding undervalued
assets and from more efficient asset management.
8. Scholes and Wolfson [1991] also develop a model that would apply to MLPs
which compares the after-tax returns to investing in partnerships with those from
investing in corporations. They state [1991, p. 4-8]: "Whether the partnership form
provides greater after-tax rates of return than does the corporate form depends
upon four factors [1991
,
p. 4-8]: (1) the ordinary tax rate tp, (2) the corporate tax rate
tc, (3) the taxes that are paid at the shareholder level gtp, and (4) the length of the
investment horizon." After further analysis, they conclude [p. 4-30]: "Unless there is
substantial compensating non-tax benefits, our analysis suggests that partnerships
dominate corporations if new equity must be issued to finance investment projects
after the 1986 Tax Act. By implication, for tax reasons alone, the dollar volume of
new issues of common stock to finance investments should fall and the number of
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partnership and S-Corporation formations to undertake new projects should
increase."
9. Free cash flows are those funds generated internally in the firm that are in
excess of those required to fund all positive net present value projects.
10. He cites Jensen's example of of the use of LBOs or debt/equity swaps as an
example of such organizational re-transformations.
1 1
.
Partnership net income and other tax attributes are credited directly to the
partners account according to a fixed contract. There is wide latitude in the terms
that can be incorporated in the partnership agreement regarding the general
partner's discretion in distributing assets to unit holders. However, once agreement
has been reached, the general partner's discretion over the use of partnership
assets is bound by its terms. In some cases, the general partner may enjoy
considerable discretion in the early years of the partnership. However, as time
goes on, invariably that discretion declines [Kensinger, p. 74].
12. All analyses were also conducted with the outlier firm included. The results
are essentially the same for all periods except 1987 when the mean difference
between treatment and control firms for the FREE variable is significant but does
not have the predicted sign. Results reported in the paper do not include the
outlier.
1 3. Many of the corporations that converted substantially all or all of their assets
to an MLP were "private companies" prior to their reorganization. In addition, many
of the entities converted through rollouts were corporate subsidiaries or divisions of
much larger corporations. These entities did not prepare public financial
statements prior to the MLP conversion either because they were not required to or
because their financial statements were consolidated with the larger corporate
entity. Consequently, for these entities, it was only possible to obtain at least two
years of pre-conversion financial statement data from the registration statements of
the new MLP.
14. This recognizes the fact the the process of issuing registration statements
and establishing an MLP can take six months to a year to accomplish. Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that the decision to establish the MLP would have been
made based on the financial data of the entity during the year prior to the date of
creation, and not the most current financial statements which existed as of the date
of conversion/roll-out.
15. This additional screening technique was not practical for the 1980 and 1983
control groups, as there was only one MLP conversion in 1981 and there were two
in 1984. Subsequently, for these groups, all firms that had net sales within +/- 20%
of the net sales of the treatment firms (in the year before they converted to MLP)
were included in the control sample. The same 234 firms were selected for the
1986 and 1987 control samples (i.e., these firms had no missing data for the two
year period).
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Appendix A
Complete Listing of Master Limited Partnerships Included In Study
TYPE
Panel A - Conversions
Allstar Inns, LP.
Furr's/Bishop's Cafeterias, L.P.
Sahara Casino Partners, L.P.
Sun Distributors L.P.
Alliance Capital Management LP.
Oppenheimer Capital, L.P.
Emerald Homes
Interstate General Co., L.P.
The Marina L.P.
Motel 6 L.P.
Perkins Family Restaurants, L.P.
Standard Pacific L.P.
Universal Medical Buildings L.P.
Boston Celtics LP.
Intelligent Systems Master L.P.
National Healthcorp L.P.
Tenera L.P.
USA Cafes LP.
Servicemaster L.P.
Newhall Land & Farming Co.
Royal Palm Beach Colony L.P.
UDC-Universal Development L.P.
Sun Energy Partners
Mesa Limited Partnership
Lear Petroleum Partners, L.P.
OKC Limited Partnership
Panel B - Roll-outs
Petrolane Partners, L.P.
Fine Homes International, L.P.
Winchell's Donut House L.P.
Commonwealth Mortgage of America, L.P.
FFP Partners, L.P.
Jones Intercable Investors L.P.
Mauna Loa Macadamia Partners L.P.
Freeport-McMoRan Resource Partners.
Diamond Shamrock Offshore Partners
Santa Fe Energy Partners
IP Timberlands, Ltd.
Freeport McMoRan Energy Partners, Ltd.
YEAR
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1984
1981
1987
1987
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1985
1985
1985
1984
Table 1 Reconciliation of the Total Number of MLPs
in Existence and Firm Sample
MLPs in existence as of October 1988 1 1
9
Less:
a. MLPs formed through roll-ups 36
b. MLPs formed through contributions 27
c. S-Corporations converting to MLP 2
d. MLP classified as a utility 1
e. MLP not organized as a "going concern 1
f. MLP excluded from study because free cash
measure was 20 standard deviations from
the mean of the group. 1
g. MLPs formed through roll-out or conversion
with incomplete financial information 1
3
MLPs included in study 38_
Source: The initial listing of MLPs was obtained from the October, 1988
issue of The Stanger Register. Detailed information regarding the
classification of MLPs was obtained from their initial security offering
document or subsequent Form 10-K.
Table 2 Year and Method of Formation of MLPs
Formation Year
1980
1984
1985
1986
1987
Total
Source: Information regarding the proper classification of each MLP
security offering document or a subsuequent Form 1 0-K.
Conversions Roll-outs
1
1 1
5 3
13 6
6 2
26 12
was obtained from the initial
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Treatment and Control
Firms
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Panel A: MLPs formed before 1986
Treatment Firms (n=11):
SIZE* 1,187.00 1,836.01 35.49 5,600.00
DEBT 0.4826 0.3498 0.0000 1.1920
TAX 0.2607 0.3094 0.0000 1.0000
FREE 0.3502 0.3054 -0.1494 0.7758
Control Firms (n=55):
SIZE3 236.04 189.80 52.41 1,092.40
DEBT 0.5353 0.3036 0.0050 1 .7350
TAX 0.1469 0.2514 0.0000 0.8690
FREE -0.0099 0.4954 -2.9829 0.6591
Panel B: MLPs formed in 1986
Treatment firms (n=19):
SIZE** 145.52 225.32 3.10 948.88
DEBT 0.4442 0.4154 0.0000 1 .3444
TAX 0.3363 0.2745 0.0000 1.0000
FREE 0.1485 0.1831 -0.0707 0.7719
Control Firms (n=151):
SIZE* 201.66 213.69 3.93 937.14
DEBT 0.4620 0.3581 0.0000 2.6203
TAX 0.1604 0.1828 0.0000 0.7845
FREE 0.0470 0.3165 -2.0080 0.7840
Panel C: MLPs formed in 1987
Treatment firms (n=8):
SIZES 314.01 276.70 22.31 817.75
DEBT 0.5150 0.3905 0.0000 0.8865
TAX 0.3506 0.3536 0.0000 1.0000
FREE 0.0343 0.0734 -1.289 0.1282
Control Firms (n=83):
SIZE3 225.76 166.21 38.87 814.89
DEBT 0.4595 0.2289 0.0000 1.1143
TAX 0.2425 0.2411 0.0000 0.9304
FREE 0.0638 0.2411 -0.8588 1.0676
Table 3 Continued
SIZE = Total assets.
DEBT = (current + long-term debt)/(current + long-term debt + equity).
TAX a (Current federal and state taxes)/(net income before extra-ordinary
items).
FREE = Cash-Dividends. Where Cash= Net income before extra-ordinary
items + Change in working capital (excluding cash and short-term
investments) + deferred tax expense + depreciation and
amortization expense.
a Amounts are millions of dollars.
Table 4 Univariate Analysis - MLP Firms versus Control
Firms (Mann-Whitney U Test)
Variable U Score U' Score Z Statistic p-valuea
Pre-1986 MLPs (n^1 1) and Control Firms (n=55):
SIZE 188.50 416.50
DEBT 264.00 341.00
TAX 206.00 399.00
FREE 144.00 461.00
1.961
-0.662
1.800
2.727
0.0498
0.2538
0.0359
0.0032
1986 MLPs (n=19) and Control Firms (n=151):
SIZE 1.087.50 1.781.50
DEBT 1,351.00 1,518.00
TAX 897.00 1,972.00
FREE 1,202.00 1,667.00
-1.716
-0.413
2.725
1.150
0.0861
0.3398
0.0032
0.1255
1987 MLPs (n=8) and Control Firms (n=83):
SIZE 285.00 379.00 0.659 0.5101
DEBT 291.50 372.50 0.568 0.2852
TAX 330.50 333.50 0.021 0.4914
FREE 243.00 413.00 -1.205 0.1142
SIZE =Total assets.
DEBT =(current + long-term debt)/(current + long-term debt + equity).
TAX =(Current federal and state taxes)/(net income before extra-ordinary
items).
FREE =Cash-Dividends. Where Cash= Net income before extra-ordinary
items + Change in working capital (excluding cash and short-term
investments) + deferred tax expense + depreciation and
amortization expense.
a The test for SIZE is two-tailed. DEBT, TAX, and FREE are tested using
one-tailed tests.
Table 5 Probit Analysis of MLPs versus Control Firms
Panel A: MLP Formations Before 1986:
Estimated
Variable Coeficient Standard Error T~Statistica
CONSTANT -4.3568 1 .4947 -2.9148
SIZE 0.4274 0.2591 1.6497***
DEBT 0.2458 0.7714 0.3187
TAX 1.9679 0.8685 2.2659**
FREE 2.8675 1.1706 2.4497*
Liklihood Ratio Test: 1 8.6847*
Gragg-Uhler R-squared: 0.4152
Percentage of right predictions: 0.9242
Panel B: MLP Formations in 1986;
Variable
Estimated
Coeficient Standard Error T-Statistica
CONSTANT -1.4289 0.5461 -2.6167
SIZE -0.1549 0.0988 -1.5675*
DEBT 0.6396 0.3705 1.7261*
TAX 2.3950 0.7094 3.3761*
FREE 0.5748 0.6281 0.9245
Liklihood Ratio Test: 1 7.41 1 9*
Gragg-Uhler R-squared: 0.1933
Percentage of right predictions: 0.8824
Panel C: MLPs Formed in 1987:
Estimated
Variable Coeficient Standard Error T-Statistica
CONSTANT -2.1990 1.3066 -1.6830
SIZE 0.1296 0.2338 0.5542
DEBT 0.3338 0.7470 0.4468
TAX 0.0955 0.8161 0.1170
FREE -0.3712 0.8747 -0.4244
Liklihood Ratio Test: 0.7829
Gragg-Uhler R-squared: 0.0191
Percentage of right predictions: 0.9242
Table 5 Continued
SIZE ^Natural log of total assets.
DEBT ^(current + long-term debt)/(current + long-term debt + equity)
TAX =(Current federal and state taxes)/(net income before extra-ordinary
items.
FREE =Cash - Dividends. Where Cash=Net income before extra-ordinary
items+ change in working capital (excluding cash and short-term
investments) + deferred tax expense + depreciation and
amortization expense.
Significant at less than 1%.
Significant at less than 2%.
*** Significant at less than 5%.
**** Significant at less than 6%.
a The test for SIZE is two tailed. DEBT, TAX and FREE are tested using
one-tailed tests.
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for MLP Roll-outs and Conversions
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
MLP Roll-outs (n=1 2):
SIZE3
DEBT
TAX
FREE
430.08
0.3721
0.3046
0.3461
334.17
0.4724
0.2613
0.2666
13.10
0.0000
0.0000
0.0270
911.71
1 .3444
7656
0.7779
MLP Conversions (n=26):
SIZE3
DEBT
TAX
FREE
506.70
0.5155
0.3236
0.1075
1,292.00
0.3497
0.3154
0.1824
3.10
0.0000
0.0000
-0.1494
5,600.00
1.1192
1.0000
0.7758
SIZE =Total assets.
DEBT =(current + long-term debt)/(current + long-term debt + equity).
TAX =(Current federal and state taxes)/(net income before extra-ordinary
items).
FREE =Cash-Dividends. Where Cash= Net income before extra-ordinary
items + Change in working capital (excluding cash and short-term
investments) + deferred tax expense + depreciation and
amortization expense.
3 Amounts are millions of dollars.
Table 7 Univariate Analysis - MLP Roll-outs versus Conversions (Mann-
Whitney U Test)
Variable U Score U' Score Z Statistic p-value
MLP Roll-outs (n=12) and Conversions (n=26):
SIZE 100.00 212.00
DEBT 100.00 200.00
TAX 152.50 159.50
FREE 69.00 243.00
1.759
1.624
0.111
-2.732
0.0786
0.1044
0.9118
0.0064
SIZE =Total assets.
DEBT =(current + long-term debt)/(current + long-term debt + equity).
TAX =(Current federal and state taxes)/(net income before extra-ordinary
items).
FREE =Cash-Dividends. Where Cash= Net income before extra-ordinary
items + Change in working capital (excluding cash and short-term
investments) + deferred tax expense + depreciation and
amortization expense.
0.9397 0.8669 1.0841
0.0789 0.1454 -0.5422
0.8449 0.6576 1 .2848
0.3175 0.9842 0.3226
2.7257 1.1263 -2.4198*
Table 8 Probit Analysis of MLP Roll-outs versus Conversions
Estimated
Variable Coeficient Standard Error T-Statistic
CONSTANT
SIZE
DEBT
TAX
FREE
Liklihood Ratio Test: 1 0.41 76"
Gragg-Uhler R-squared: 0.3364
Percentage of right predictions: 0.8158
SIZE =Natural log of total assets.
DEBT =(current + long-term debt)/(current + long-term debt + equity).
TAX =(Current federal and state taxes)/(net income before extra-ordinary
items).
FREE =Cash-Dividends. Where Cash= Net income before extra-ordinary
items + Change in working capital (excluding cash and short-term
investments) + deferred tax expense + depreciation and
amortization expense.
Significant at less than 1%.
Significant at less than 5%.
Table 9 Univariate Analysis - MLP Roll-outs, Conversions versus
Control Firms (Mann-Whitney U Test)
Variable U Score U' Score Z Statistic p-valuea
MLP Roll-outs (n=12) and Control Firms (n=57):
SIZE 266.00 418.00
DEBT 214.00 470.00
TAX 274.00 410.00
FREE 151.00 533.00
1.203
-2.027
1.097
3.024
0.2289
0.0214
0.1363
0.0013
MLP Conversions (n=26) and Control Firms (n=219):
SIZE 2,639.00 3,055.00
DEBT 2,403.00 3,072.00
TAX 2,022.00 3,672.00
FREE 2,702.00 2,992.00
0.609
1.001
2.516
0.424
0.5427
0.1585
0.0060
0.3357
SIZE =Total assets.
DEBT =(current + long-term debt)/(current + long-term debt + equity).
TAX =(Current federal and state taxes)/(net income before extra-ordinary
items).
FREE =Cash-Dividends. Where Cash= Net income before extra-ordinary
items + Change in working capital (excluding cash and short-term
investments) + deferred tax expense + depreciation and
amortization expense.
a The test for SIZE is two-tailed. DEBT, TAX, and FREE are tested using
one-tailed tests.
Table 10 Probit Analysis of MLP Roll-out versus Control Firms
Variable
Estimated
Coeficient Standard Error T-Statistica
CONSTANT
SIZE
DEBT
TAX
FREE
Liklihood Ratio Test: 18.6695*
Gragg-Uhler R-squared: 0.3967
Percentage of right predictions: 0.8551
1.9065 1.1708 -1.6284
0.0723 0.1775 4071
0.7521 0.6530 -1.1518
1.0948 0.9482 1.1546
3.7919 1.2854 2.9500*
Significant at less than 1%.
SIZE ^Natural log of total assets.
DEBT =(current + long-term debt)/(current + long-term debt + equity)
TAX =(Current federal and state taxes)/(net income before extra-ordinary
items).
FREE =Cash-Dividends. Where Cash= Net income before extra-ordinary
items + Change in working capital (excluding cash and short-term
investments) + deferred tax expense + depreciation and
amortization expense.
a The test for SIZE is two-tailed. DEBT, TAX, and FREE are tested using
one-tailed tests.
Table 11 Probit Analysis of MLP Conversion versus Control Firms
Variable
Estimated
Coeficient Standard Error T-Statistica
CONSTANT
SIZE
DEBT
TAX
FREE
Liklihood Ratio Test: 15.9465*
Gragg-Uhler R-squared: 0.1282
Percentage of right predictions: 0.9051
1.8520 0.4758 -3.8927
0.0714 0.4240 -0.7773
0.9869 0.4817 2.3278*
1.7517 0.5348 3.6365*
0.7276 0.4758 1 .3578*
SIZE
DEBT
TAX
Significant at less than 1%.
Significant at less than 1 0%
FREE
=Natural log of total assets.
=(current + long-term debt)/(current + long-term debt + equity).
=(Current federal and state taxes)/(net income before extra-ordinary
items)
=Cash-Dividends. Where Cash= Net income before extra-ordinary
items + Change in working capital (excluding cash and short-term
investments) + deferred tax expense + depreciation and
amortization expense.
a The test for SIZE is two-tailed. DEBT, TAX, and FREE are tested using
one-tailed tests.
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